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Abstract
In this work, we analyze the secrecy rate in a cooperative network, where a source node is assisted by relay nodes
via cooperative jamming for delivering a secret message to the destination in the presence of an eavesdropper node.
We consider the availability of both full and partial channel state information (CSI), and we take into account average
power limitation at the relays as we formulate the rate maximization problem as a primal-dual problem. We derive
the closed form solution for the full CSI case, and we show that the optimal solution allows the transmission of only
one relay. For the partial CSI case, we define the concept of secrecy outage, where some of packets are intercepted
by the eavesdropper, and we derive the secrecy outage probability and throughput in terms of average channel
statistics. Due to the high nonlinearity of the secrecy throughput term, we propose a gradient update algorithm for
obtaining the optimal power solutions for the partial CSI case. Our simulations demonstrate the gains of cooperative
jamming over direct transmission for both full and partial CSI cases, where it is shown that the secrecy rate of
the direct transmission is increased significantly, by %20 %80, when cooperative jamming is employed with our
optimal power assignment algorithm.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
Confidentiality is a fundamental requirement for communication over wireless networks, since the broadcast
nature of the wireless medium gives rise to a number of security issues. Basically, any node within the range of
a transmitter node can eavesdrop the channel and it can extract the transmission over the so-called eavesdropper
channel. Existing cryptography techniques, which mainly depend on secret keys address the security needs of
wireless networks; however they fail to provide unconditional security. Moreover, the distribution and maintenance
of secret keys are still open issues for large scale wireless networks. Fortunately, in the seminal paper of Wyner
[1], it is shown that, when the main channel is a degraded version of the eavesdropper channel, a source node
can send secret messages to a destination node with non-zero rate via Wyner secrecy encoding, while keeping the
eavesdropper completely ignorant of the messages. The rate at which the destination node can decode the message, is
defined as the secrecy rate. In [2], the “secrecy rate” region of broadcast channels is obtained. Recently, the concept
of physical layer security introduced by Wyner is revisited in [3], where the wireless channel characteristics, such as
fading and noise are exploited for improving the security of the main channel without degrading the eavesdropper
channel.
The issue with physical layer security is that the secrecy rate is affected by the quality of the source-destination and
the source-eavesdropper channels. Specifically, the secrecy rate can be very small, as low as zero in secrecy outage,
when the eavesdropper has better channel conditions than the source. A possible solution is to utilize multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) systems, where by using multiple antennas, the source-eavesdropper channel can
be disrupted, and the information obtained by the eavesdropper can be reduced [4]. Cooperative communication
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2can also increase the secrecy rate by exploiting the relay channels via cooperative jamming, where a relay creates
interference at the eavesdropper by transmitting a jamming signal. The jamming signal power should be high enough
to disturb the received signal at the eavesdropper; however allocating too much power on the jamming signal can
also degrade the signal quality at the destination. Thus, it is essential to assign the jamming power levels optimally,
so that the secrecy rate can be maximized. Among the existing works, [5] studies the use of decode-and-forward
(DF) relays with multiple eavesdroppers, [6] analyzes both DF and amplify-and-forward (AF) cooperative schemes
with a constraint on total power at the relays, and [8] considers both DF and AF cooperative schemes with individual
power constraints at each relay. In a recent work, [7], the cooperative jamming (CJ) power allocation problem is
solved with convex optimization and a one-dimensional search algorithm. The solutions proposed in the existing
works are not only sub-optimal, since they are obtained by nulling out the jamming signal at the destination, but
also they are obtained considering static channels with fixed channel gains.
In this paper, we consider a cooperative jamming scenario with multiple relays and, and we study the optimal
relay power allocation problem, specifically under individual power constraints per relay and time-varying wireless
channel conditions. We consider the two cases: (1) when all instantaneous channel gains are known at the source
node, i.e., the source node has full channel state information (CSI), (2) when the instantaneous gains of the channels
towards the destination node and the relay nodes are known at the source node, but only the statistics of the source-
eavesdropper and relay-eavesdropper channels are available, i.e., the source node has partial CSI. We solve the
power optimization problem via the primal-dual approach for both cases. We derive a closed form solution for the
full CSI case, and we propose a gradient update algorithm for obtaining the optimal relay power assignments for
partial CSI case. By the primal dual approach, the optimal solution can be re-obtained adaptively for time-varying
wireless conditions. The gradient update algorithm is also shown to converge fastly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present the system model and the secrecy rate for
full and partial CSI cases. In section III, we formulate the primal-dual algorithm for cooperative jamming and we
derive the optimal solution for the full CSI case. In Section IV, we investigate the cooperative jamming problem
for the partial CSI case and we propose the gradient update algorithm. Section V presents our performance results
under different scenarios, and Section VI involves our concluding remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless network, where a source node wants to communicate with a destination node in the
presence of an eavesdropper node, and n relay nodes are helping the source with cooperative jamming as depicted
in Fig. 1. The eavesdropper is a passive attacker, whose goal is to interpret the source information without trying to
modify it. All channels undergo quasi-static flat Rayleigh fading, in which the channel gain remains constant within
a time slot and varies independently from slot to slot. For a time slot k, hSD(k) denotes the gain of the channel
between the source and the destination nodes, referred to as the main channel; hSJ(k) is the gain of the source-
eavesdropper channel, referred to as the eavesdropper channel; hRiJ(k) and hRiD(k) denote the gains of the channels
from the relay node i to the eavesdropper and destination node respectively, referred to as the relay channels. Due
to Rayleigh fading, all channel gains are exponentially distributed, and for all channels additive white gaussian
channel noise is assumed with variance s2.
We first consider the case when the full channel state information (CSI) is available priori, i.e., all the channel
gains are known for each time slot k. Later, we relax this assumption, and consider the case when only the partial
CSI is available, i.e., the instantaneous gains of all channels to the destination node are available, but only the
statistics of the gain of the channels towards the eavesdropper node are available at the source node.
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Fig. 1. Network Model for Cooperative Jamming
A. Secrecy Rate with Full CSI
We first review Wyner codes, where the main idea is to introduce randomness to increase secrecy. This idea relies
on the fact that the codes make use of random channel errors (due to noise, etc.) to make sure that information
obtained by the eavesdropper is not adequate to decode the transmitted message. Let C (R(k);Rs(k);N) denote a
Wyner code of size 2NR(k) to convey a privacy message set W = (1;2; :::;2NRs(k)) in time slot k. The stochastic
encoder at the source node selects a private message, w2W , out of 2N(R(k) Rs(k)) messages independently at random
and sends a codeword aN . This operation is called random binning [1]. In the last part, decoders at the base station
and all other nodes map their received output to a private decoded message w0 2W .
Let the vector of symbols received by the eavesdropper be be. The following constraint must satisfied by the
source to achieve perfect privacy,
1
N
I(w;be) e; (1)
where I(w;be) is the mutual information between private message, w, of the source and received signal, be, of the
eavesdropper. As N ! ¥, the achievable secrecy rate, Rs(k), in time slot k is given as:
Rs(k) = [R(k) Re(k)]+ (2)
where [x]+ =max(0;x). Here, R(k) denotes the instantaneous achievable rate for the main channel, which is the mu-
tual information between the channel between the source and destination in time slot k. Likewise, Re(k) corresponds
the mutual information between the channel input at the source and the channel output at the eavesdropper.
Defining Ps as the transmission power of the source node and Pi(k) as the transmission power of relay i in time
slot k, R(k) and Re(k) are calculated as [5]:
R(k) = log

1+
PshSD(k)
s2+åi hRiD(k)Pi(k)

; (3)
and
Re(k) = log

1+
PshSJ(k)
s2+åi hRiJ(k)Pi(k)

; (4)
where all instantaneous channel gains are known for all k, which is a valid assumption when all nodes in the system,
4including the eavesdropper, have data to be transmitted, and all transmissions can be monitored and all channels
can be estimated. This is applicable particularly in networks combining multicast and unicast transmissions, where
terminals play dual roles as legitimate receivers for some signals and eavesdroppers for others.
B. Secrecy Throughput with Partial CSI
Unlike the main communication channel which can be estimated at the destination prior to data transmission,
sometimes the eavesdropper channel can be hard to predict, in particular when the eavesdropper does not participate
in communication but passively listens to the channel. In such cases, at best, the source and the relay nodes can
guess the location of the eavesdropper and estimate the statistics of their channel to this node.
For the partial CSI case, due to absence of the instantaneous gains of the eavesdropper channels, one cannot
choose the code rate pair utilized in Wyner code, C (R(k);Rs(k);N) to realize perfect secrecy. Instead, and in-
advance secrecy rate is used in each time slot k, denoted as Rˆs(k). However, this leads to secrecy outages. When
R(k)  Rˆs(k)< Re(k), perfect secrecy constraint (1) is violated in time slot k. Specifically, R(k)  Rˆs(k) is the rate
of the randomization message the source uses in the random binning scheme for secrecy in time slot k, and if the
actual rate of the eavesdropper in time slot k, Re(k), is larger than the randomization rate, we say that secrecy
outage has occurred. The probability of secrecy outage in time slot k is given by
Ps;out(k) = P
 
R(k)  Rˆs(k)< Re(k)

: (5)
In the event of a secrecy outage, the secretly encoded message is intercepted by the eavesdropper and it cannot
be considered as a private transmission. We define the secrecy throughput as the rate of information transferred to
the destination without secrecy outage, and we calculate it as follows:
Rs;th(k) = Rˆs(k)(1 Ps;out(k)) : (6)
III. COOPERATIVE JAMMING WITH FULL CSI
Given the full CSI, our aim is to maximize the average secrecy rate by properly allocating the power of each
relay under average power constraint per relay. Our optimization problem is expressed as
max
Pi
E [Rs(k)] s.t. P¯i(k) ai 8i; (7)
where Rs(k) calculated as in (2). Time averaging is considered and ai is the maximum average transmit power of
relay i.
For solving the secrecy rate maximization problem, we consider the Lagrangian approach and the dual objective, as
the optimization tool to solve the optimization problem in (7) [9]. Defining the power of n relays at slot k as, P(k) =
[P1(k) P2(k) ::: Pn(k)], and the Lagrange multipliers of the dual of the problem as, m(k) = [m1(k) m2(k) ::: mn(k)],
the Lagrangian of (7) is given by
L(P(k);m(k)) = Rs(k) å
i
mi(k)(Pi(k) ai) (8)
where m(k) 0 is the Lagrange multiplier. Then, the dual objective function can be written as,
G(m(k)) =max
P(k)
L(P(k);m(k)); (9)
5and accordingly, the dual problem is given by
min
m(k)
G(m(k)) (10)
In this formulation, m(k) can be interpreted as the power price vector for the relays. When the relay power, Pi(k),
exceeds ai, its price mi(k) is increased, otherwise mi(k) is reduced.
We now devise a primal-dual algorithm to find the optimal power levels and the prices. More specifically, the
powers and prices are updated in such a way that the Lagrangian is maximized with respect to Pi’s for the primal
objective function, and minimized with respect to mi(k)’s for the dual.
We first consider optimizing the Lagrangian function with respect to P(k). Note that, the Lagrangian function
is not a concave function with respect P(k), due to the existence of power variables in the denominators. In what
follows, we show that for the Lagrangian function to be maximized, for any given m(k), allowing the transmission of
only one relay is optimal. This reduces the dimensionality of the problem and yields simpler analysis to investigate
the optimal point.
Proposition 1: In the optimal power control policy, P(k) that maximizes (8) per time slot k, only one relay is
to transmit, with a non-zero power, i.e., Pi(k)> 0 and Pj(k) = 0;8 j 6= i, where i is the optimal relay.
Proof Let us first analyze the case when there are only two relays and let us arbitrarily fix the total power level as
P, the power allocated to relay 1 as P1(k) and the power allocated to relay 2 as P2(k) = P P1(k). Next, we will
generalize this result for a number of n relays. The partial derivatives of (8) with respect to P1(k) and P2(k) are
obtained as:
¶L
¶P1(k)
= PshSD(k)(hR1D(k) hR2D(k))
(PshSD(k)+A)A
+
PshSJ(k)(hR1J(k) hR2J(k))
(PshSJ(k)+B)B
 m1+m2 (11)
¶L
¶P2(k)
=å
i
 PshSD(k)(hR2D(k) hR1D(k))
(PshSD(k)+A)A
+
PshSJ(k)(hR2J(k) hR1J(k))
(PshSJ(k)+B)B
 m2 (12)
where A= s2+P1(k)hR1D(k)+(P P1(k))hR2D(k) and B= s2+P1(k)hR1J(k)+(P P1(k))hR2J(k). As clearly seen
in (11) and (12), ¶L¶P1(k) = 
¶L
¶P2(k)
. Therefore, either (11) or (12) is monotonically decreasing. Thus, the Lagrangian
is maximized either when P1(k) = 0 or P2(k) = 0.
In order to extend the analysis for arbitrary number of relays, let us define N as the set of n active relays,
where a relay is active when it is assigned a non-zero transmit power. Again, assuming fixed total power, P, it is
possible to find a relay m, whose transmission power is Pm(k) = P åi6= jPi(k), where Pi(k) is the transmit power
of relay i. The partial derivative of (8) with respect to Pi(k) is:
¶L
¶Pi(k)
= PshSD(k)(hRiD(k) hRnD(k))
(PshSD(k)+A0)A0
+
PshSJ(k)(hRiJ(k) hRnJ(k))
(PshSJ(k)+B0)B0
 mi(k) (13)
where A0=s2+åi6=mPi(k)hRiD(k)+(P åi 6=mPi(k))hRmD(k) and B0=s2+åi6=mPi(k)hRiJ(k)+(P åi6=kPi(k))hRmJ(k).
Obviously, the partial derivatives of (8) with respect to Pm(k) is
¶L
¶Pm(k)
= å
i6=m
¶L
¶Pi(k)
(14)
Here, the relay m satisfies ¶L¶Pm(k) > 0 and consequently, we have
¶L
¶Pi(k)
< 0. This result suggests that at the optimal
point, Pm(k) = 0. Relay m can be interpreted as the relay, which has the least possible contribution for increasing
6the secrecy rate due to jamming. In the next step, we reduce the active set to N  fmg, and we conduct the same
analysis over this set, N  fmg. In each step, we find out that there is a relay whose transmit power is equal to
zero at the optimal point. In the last step, when only two relays are left in the active set, we conduct the above
analysis for two relays. As a result, by induction, it is shown that at the optimal point, only one relay has non-zero
allocated power.
The significance of Proposition 1 is that, for a given channel state in time slot k, the achievable secrecy rate can
be obtained in closed form. From the application point of view, the source will separately compute the optimal
power for each relay, with the condition that the other relays have zero transmit power. Then, it will select the
relay whose optimal power maximizes the Lagrangian function in (8).
Next, we find the optimal power level for each relay. Considering relay i and by differentiating (8) with respect
to Pi, we get
¶L
¶Pi(k)
=  PshSD(k)hRiD(k)
(PshSD(k)+s2+Pi(k)hRiD(k))(s2+Pi(k)hRiD(k))
+
PshSJ(k)hRiJ(k)
(PshSJ(k)+s2+Pi(k)hRiJ(k))(s2+Pi(k)hRiJ(k))
 mi(k) (15)
For obtaining the roots of the above equation, we solve the fourth order polynomial equation below:
Fi;4Pi(k)4+Fi;3Pi(k)3+Fi;2Pi(k)2+Fi;1Pi(k)+Fi;0 = 0; (16)
where
Fi;4 = hRiD(k)hRiJ(k)
Fi;3 = hRiD(k)hRiJ(k)(PshSD(k)+2s
2)+hRiD(k)hRiJ(k)(PshSJ(k)+2s
2)
Fi;2 = hSJ(k)hRiD(k) hSD(k)hRiJ(k)  (PshSJ(k)+s2)s2hRiD(k)
  (PshSD(k)+s2)s2hRiJ(k) hRiD(k)hRiJ(k)(PshSJ(k)+2s2)(PshSD(k)+2s2)
Fi;1 = hSJ(k)hRiD(k)(PshSD(k)+2s
2) hSD(k)hRiJ(k)(PshSJ(k)+2s2)
Fi;0 = mi(k)(PshSD(k)+s2)(PshSJ(k)+s2)s4
(17)
The solution of the quadratic equation in (16) can be expressed in closed form as given in [14]. The gradient of
L(P(k);m(k)) with respect to mi(k) is obtained as:
Lmi(k)(P(k);m(k)) = ai Pi(k); (18)
and the optimal solution is obtained by solving (16) and (18).
Finally, for updating mi’s we employ the sub-gradient algorithm, since it has been widely applied in solving
Lagrangian problems. The sub-gradient algorithm is a simple and effective method, similar to the gradient descent
method, but differently, the sub-gradient method is also applicable to non-differentiable objectives [9]. In our
problem, the updates of mi’s are in the negative direction of the gradient of L(P(k);m(k)) in (18) calculated as:
mi(k+1) = (mi(k)  e(k)(ai Pi(k)))+ ; (19)
where [x]+ = max(0;x) and e(k)  0 is the step size. The convergence of the sub-gradient algorithm is shown in
7[12] for a arbitrarily small step sizes.
Summarizing our cooperative jamming solution, for each time slot k, the source node calculates the transmit
power, Pi(k), of each relay i, based on the channel gains and the Lagrange multipliers, mi(k). The relay, which
maximizes the Lagrangian function in (8), is selected, and other relays are set to have zero transmit power. The
Lagrange multipliers are updated based on equation (19).
IV. COOPERATIVE JAMMING WITH PARTIAL CSI
In this section, we investigate the cooperative jamming scenario when only partial CSI is available, when the
statistics of the channels from the source to the eavesdropper and from the relays to the eavesdropper are given at
the source node.
As explained in Section II. B, a secrecy outage event takes place, when the eavesdropper has obtained more
information than the randomization rate in a privately encoded message. In time-varying wireless channels, a channel
outage occurs when the received signal to interference/noise ratio drops below a threshold necessary for decoding
the transmitted signal. Likewise, a secrecy outage event occurs, when the randomized information rate drops below
the information rate obtained by the eavesdropper. In this case, the amount of randomized bits is not sufficient
to confuse the eavesdropper, and the eavesdropper obtains sufficient amount of information to decode the secret
packet. In the following, we analyze the secrecy outage probability, Ps;out(k).
Lemma 1: Given the statistics of the channels to the eavesdropper and the chosen secret encoding rate Rˆs(k),
the secrecy outage probability, is calculated as:
Ps;out(k) = e s
2lsD(k)
 
å
i
li(k)
li(k)+lsD(k)Õj 6=i
l j(k)
l j(k) li(k)
!
; (20)
where D(k) = 2R(k) Rˆs(k)  1, and li(k) = 1Pi(k)E[hRiJ] for relay i and ls =
1
PsE[hSJ ]
for the source node. Note that,
R(k), which is calculated as in (3), solely depends on gain of the channel between the source and the destination
and the gains of the relay-destination channels. Since these gains are known per time slot k, R(k) is constant in
time slot k. However, since the instantaneous gain of the eavesdropper channel is not known, Rˆs(k) is variable,
which affects the secrecy outage probability.
Proof In order to derive the secrecy outage probability, we first need to statistically characterize Re(k) in (4).
We start with the distribution of the sum of independent exponential random variables for the summation in the
denominator of the rational term in the log function in (4). Note that, each term in the summation is an exponential
random variable, corresponding to each relay’s transmission received at the eavesdropper, and recalling that all are
independent, we define (Xi)i=1;:::;n as independent exponential random variables with distinct respective parameters
li. For n= 2, the probability density function for the sum is found as [10],
fX1+X2(x) = fX1(x) fX2(x) =
Z x
0
l1e l1(x u)l2e l2xdu= l1l2
e l2x  e l1x
l1 l2 : (21)
8Considering n 3, by induction, we can obtain,
fX1+X2+:::Xn(x) = fX1+X2+:::Xn 1(x) fXn(x) =
"
n 1
Õ
i=1
li
#
n 1
å
j=1
e l jx
Õk 6= j lk l j
 fXn(x)
=
"
n 1
Õ
i=1
li
#
n 1
å
j=1
e lnx  e l jx
(l j ln)Õk 6= j lk l j
=
"
n
Õ
i=1
li
#
n
å
j=1
e l jx
(l j ln)Õk 6= j lk l j
;x> 0: (22)
Next, we define a new random variable Y , as Y = X1+X2+ ::::+Xn+s2, where Xi denotes the signal received
from relay i and s2 denotes the constant noise variance. Then, fY (y) is obtained as:
fY (y) =
"
n
Õ
i=1
li
#
n
å
j=1
e l j(y s2)
(l j ln)Õk 6= j lk l j
;y> s2: (23)
Now, let Z be the random variable for the numerator term in (4) due to the transmission from the source to the
eavesdropper. We know that Z is also exponential with fZ(z) = lse lsz, where ls = 1PsE[hSJ ] . Now, re-writing the
definition in (5), we are ready to calculate the secrecy outage probability,
Ps;out(k) = P

R(k)  Rˆs(k)< log

1+
Z
Y

= P

D(k)<
Z
Y

= P(D(k)Y < Z) (24)
where D(k) = 2R(k) Rˆs(k) 1. Since the random variables Y and Z are independent, we can calculate this probability
as:
Ps;out(k) =
Z ¥
y=s2
Z ¥
z=D(k)y
fY (y) fZ(z)dydz
=
Z ¥
y=s2
Z ¥
z=D(k)y
"
n
Õ
i=1
li
n
å
j=1
e l j(y s2)
Õk 6= j lk l j
#
lse lszdydz
=
Z ¥
y=s2
"
n
Õ
i=1
li
n
å
j=1
e l j(y s2)elsyD(k)
(l j ln)Õk 6= j lk l j
#
dy
=
"
n
Õ
i=1
li
n
å
j=1
e l j(y s2)elsyD(k)
Õk 6= j lk l j
  1
l j+lsD(k)
#
j¥s2
= e lsDs
2
n
Õ
i=1
li
n
å
j=1
1
Õk 6= j lk l j
1
l j+lsD
(25)
After simplifications on (25), we obtain the result in Lemma 1. This has concluded the proof.
Proposition 2: The following relationship should be satisfied for a relay to improve the secure communication
rate:
2 Rˆs(k)
PshSD(k)
s2
(E [hRiJ]+hRiD(k))< E [hRiJ]

2 Rˆs(k) 1

: (26)
The above condition ensures that positive transmit power of relay i decreases the secrecy outage probability.
9Otherwise, it only increases the secrecy outage probability and decreases the secrecy throughput.
Proof In order to determine whether a relay i can contribute the source’s private transmission, we need to show
that the secrecy outage probability is a decreasing function with respect to the transmit power of relay i, Pi(k),
which is evaluated at zero. First, we obtain the derivative of Ps;out(k) with respect to Pi(k):
¶Ps;out(k)
¶Pi(k)
=
¶e s2lsD(k)

li
li+lsD(k)

¶Pi(k)
= e s2lsD(k)s2ls ¶D¶Pi(k)

li
l+lsD(k)

+ e l
2lsD
0@ ¶li¶Pi(k)lsD(k) lils ¶D(k)¶Pi(k)
(li+lsD)2
1A (27)
where ¶D(k)¶Pi(k) = 2 Rˆs(k)
PshSD(k)hRiD(k)
(s2+Pi(k)hRiD(k))
2 . If we evaluate the derivative in (27) at Pi(k) = 0:
¶Ps;out(k)
¶Pi(k)
jPi(k)=0 = ls2 Rˆs(k)
PshSD(k)hRiD(k)
s2
 E [hRiJ]ls(2 Rˆs(1+
PshSD(k)
s2
 1)< 0: (28)
In order to increase the secrecy rate of the source, the derivative ¶Ps;out(k)¶Pi(k) jPi(k)=0 in (28) should be negative, which
means that the secrecy outage probability is a decreasing function of Pi(k). Thus, arranging the terms in (28), we
obtain the following relationship:
2 Rˆs(k)
PshSD(k)
s2
(E [hRiJ]+hRiD(k))< E [hRiJ]

2 Rˆs(k) 1

: (29)
Our objective is to maximize the secret information transmitted to the destination node without secrecy outage,
so we want to maximize the secrecy throughput which is defined in (6). Thus, the optimization problem in (7) is
modified for the partial CSI case as:
max
Pi(k)
E

Rˆs(k)(1 Ps;out(k))

s.t. P¯i(k) ai 8i: (30)
We solve this optimization problem again by the Lagrangian approach and the dual objective. Obtaining the
Lagrangian as,
L(P(k);m(k)) = Rˆs(k)(1 Ps;out(k)) å
i
mi(k)(Pi(k) ai) (31)
and the dual objective function as,
G(m(k)) =max
P(k)
L(P(k);m(k)); (32)
the dual problem is given by,
min
m(k)
G(m(k)): (33)
Taking the derivative of L(P(k);m(k)) with respect to Pi(k), the gradient is obtained as follows:
LPi(k)(P(k);m(k)) =
¶ Rˆs(k)(1 Ps;out(k))
¶Pi(k)
 mi(k)Pi(k); : (34)
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Similar to the full CSI case, we again propose to use the sub-gradient algorithm for updating mi’s:
mi(k+1) = (mi(k)  e(k)(ai Pi(k)))+ ; (35)
where [x]+ =max(0;x) and e(k) 0 is the step size.
Since the function in (34) is highly non-linear with respect to Pi(k), obtaining optimal Pi (k) is rather involved.
Therefore, we propose to use the gradient algorithm for power assignment as well. Since we analyze the power
levels within each time slot, we drop the time slot variable k and the source updates the utilized power Pi from
relay i according to the following dynamic equation:
fi =
dPi
dt
= P˙i = di ¶L¶Pi 8i; (36)
where d is a positive step-size. Now, we introduce a smaller scale time unit, l, where the power levels are updated
as:
P(l)i = P
(l 1)
i + P˙i
(l 1) 8i: (37)
By taking the derivative of the Lagrangian in (34) with respect to Pi, we obtain fi
fi = e s
2lsDs2ls
¶D
¶Pi
:
 
å
i
lk
lk+lsDÕj 6=k
l j
l j lk
!
  e s 2lsD
 
 å
j 6=i
l j
(l j+lsD)2
l j
l j li
¶D
¶Pi
+å
j 6=i
l j
l j+lsD
l j
(l j li)2
¶li
¶Pi
!
(38)
where
¶D
¶Pi
= 2 Rˆs PshSDhRiD 
s2+å jPjhR jD
2
and ¶li¶Pi =  
1
E[hRiJ]P
2
i
. (38) defines a method for the relays to update their purchased power levels based on the
channel gains and the current power levels of the other relays in the system.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we briefly demonstrate the performance of our proposed algorithms by investigating the secrecy
rate under cooperative jamming in comparison to the secrecy rate for transmission without cooperative jamming,
which we refer to as direct transmission and to the case when there is no eavesdropper. Capacity simulations are
performed according to the following model and parameters: The source power is set as, Ps = 1 watt. The noise
variance is s2 = 10 6 and the bandwidth isW = 1 Hz, for simplicity. We consider Rayleigh fading channels, so the
channel gains are exponentially distributed with their means calculated as E[h2] = d( c=2), where d is the distance
between considered nodes, and c is the path loss exponent (chosen here as c= 3:5). In addition, step sizes, e and
d are selected as 0.01, which are sufficiently small for the algorithms to converge. In all experiments, the average
power constraints per relay i are set identically, as ai = 0:1 8i, unless it is stated otherwise. We consider a linear
topology, where all the nodes are placed along a horizontal line. The source node is located at the origin, 0 m. The
locations of the eavesdropper node, the relays and the destination node are changed in the experiments as explained
next.
In the first set of experiments, we evaluate the secrecy rate considering our proposed optimal power allocation
solution with CJ, when full CSI is available. With the source node at 0 m., the eavesdropper node is placed at 40 m.,
and ten relays are randomly placed within (20-30) m. from the source node, we let the location of the destination
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Fig. 2. Secrecy rate versus source-destination distance
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate versus eavesdropper location
node vary from -10 m. to -80 m. from the source node. We obtain the secrecy rate curve as shown in Fig. 2,
where it is shown that the secrecy rate of the direct transmission is increased significantly, by %20 %80, when
CJ is employed with our optimal power assignment algorithm. Another important observation is that, in direct
transmission, when the source-destination distance is increased, the secrecy rate becomes smaller approaching
zero, as the eavesdropper channel becomes more favorable than the destination channel. However, even in such
challenging cases, utilizing CJ with our power assignment scheme results in a non-zero secrecy rate. We have also
investigated the secrecy rate as we varied the location of the destination from 10 m to 80 m, and we observed that
the effect of cooperative jamming is decreased as the destination node gets closer to the relays.
In the second experiment, the source node is placed at 0 m, the location of the destination node is fixed as
-10 m., and we vary the location of the eavesdropper node from -80 m. to 80 m. Again, ten relays are randomly
placed within (20-30) m. from the source node. We obtain the secrecy rate as seen in Fig. 3, where the CJ solution
again outperforms direct transmission. We also observe that, as the eavesdropper gets closer to the relay nodes, the
contribution of the relay nodes to the secrecy rate is increased. This is due to the fact that cooperative jamming
can deteriorate the information obtained by the eavesdropper more efficiently.
Finally, we investigate the effect of the number of relays on the secrecy rate. With the source at 0 m., the
destination node at -10 m. and the eavesdropper node at 40 m., we vary the number of relays, which are all co-
located at 25 m. Our results in Fig. 4 depict that, as the number of relays is increased, the secrecy rate obtained
by cooperative jamming is increased significantly up to around five relays, and afterwards we observe diminishing
returns. Naturally, the secrecy rate of the direct transmission remains the same at a level. In addition, as the number
of relays increases, the secrecy rate approaches to the rate when there is no eavesdropper in the network.
In the last experiment for the full CSI case, we observe the effect of average power constraint, ai = a 8i, on
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Fig. 5. Secrecy rate versus the average power constraint
the secrecy rate. All nodes are placed in the same locations as in the previous experiment except the number of
relays is set as five. As seen in Fig. 5, the secrecy rate is increased with the average power constraint, as expected.
Starting around a = 0:1, the power constraint becomes inactive, since the constraint is realized with equality.
Next, we investigate the performance of our proposed algorithms for CJ with partial CSI. First, we observe the
convergence of the gradient update algorithm described in Section IV. The source node in the linear topology is
located at 0 m., the eavesdropper node is at 40 m and the destination is at -10 m. In addition, five relays are
randomly located between (20-30) m. As seen in Fig. 6, the transmit power levels of the five relay nodes exhibit
fast convergence, and the optimal solution is attained within a few iterations.
In the second experiment, we observe the secrecy rate as the location of the destination node is varied. The
source node is again placed at 0 m., the destination node is at -10 m. and we vary the location of the eavesdropper
node from -80 m. to 80 m. Five relays are randomly located between (20-30) m. For these experiments, Rˆs(k) is
set as Rˆs(k) = 6 for all time slots. As seen in Fig. 7, cooperative jamming improves the secrecy throughput even
when only the partial CSI is available at source node.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the cooperative jamming approach with optimal power allocation for improving
the secure rate of wireless channels, by considering both ideal and more realistic conditions, with full CSI and
partial CSI, respectively. We formulate the power assignment problem via a primal-dual algorithm, considering
individual power constraints on the relays and time-varying channel conditions. For the full CSI case, we derive the
allocated power levels in closed form, and we propose a gradient update algorithm for obtaining optimal solutions
for the partial CSI case. Via simulations, we show that cooperative jamming with our optimal power assignment
13
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Fig. 7. Secrecy throughput versus eavesdropper location(Partial CSI Case)
algorithm increases the secrecy rate by %20 %80 over the direct transmission.
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